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1 
Richard Moran 
THEORIA, replies to critics 
 
 
 
  First of all,  I want to thank the organizers of the Inter-University Workshop on 
Philosophy and Cognitive Science, held in Valencia of 2006, where earlier versions of some of 
these papers were first presented.  I am grateful for the stimulating discussions from that event, 
and for the opportunity to reply to some of them in Theoria.   
 
 
  Josep Corbi begins his intriguing response to Authority and Estrangement (Princeton, 
2001; hereafter ‘A&E’) by describing me as still trapped within the Cartesian picture of self-
knowledge.  At first I was surprised by this.  The Cartesian picture of self-knowledge is usually 
characterized by the thought that introspection is like a form of inner perception, but one which 
is peculiarly immune to the limitations of perception of the outer world, since supposedly neither 
error nor ignorance are possible here.  On this view whatever is in the mind is necessarily 
revealed to introspection (‘self-intimation’) and whatever introspection presents to consciousness 
will be free of error or distortion.  Together these claims add up to the thesis of the mind’s 
transparence to itself, along with a certain picture of the mode or manner of self-knowledge (the 
‘perceptual model’).  There is room for debate as to what extent the historical Descartes 
subscribed to this package of views, but this is the core of the picture that has come down to us 
as ‘Cartesian’.  Hence my surprise at Corbi’s description, since much of A&E is devoted to 
working out an account of self-knowledge that denies the claims of infallibility and self-
intimation, and which diagnoses what is wrong with the perceptual model of self-knowledge 
generally.  But Corbi has another set of thoughts in mind, as close to criticisms that are 
sometimes made of Kant as they are associated with Descartes.  In this his criticisms are related 
to the complaint made by Josep Prades, that my account of both self-knowledge and intentional 
action is excessively rationalistic. I think I see the aspects of my view that give rise to this 
charge, but I hope I can show that my account only looks that way if we start with an excessively 
rationalistic picture of reason itself.   Reason comes in many varieties, some more articulate than 
others.  Insofar as it is attentive, discriminating, critical, and directed at a goal, there is reason at 
work in what Komarine Romdenh-Romluc refers to as “absorbed coping”, the skillful pursuit of 
a practical task, or finding one’s way in a complex social situation.  In the sense of ‘reason’ that 
concerns me, the dancer following the music is also engaging her reason, insofar as there is 
something she is following, trying to get right, to keep in touch with.  As long as there is room 
for the idea of correction and getting back on track, there is room for the idea that the person has 
reasons for going this way rather than that way.   
   
  Corbi’s main line of criticism concerns my characterization of the distinction between 
theoretical and deliberative attitudes, for he says that it is my understanding of the deliberative 
attitude that is contaminated with the Cartesian model.  This model, however, is not concerned 
with the thesis of infallibility or the idea of an ‘inner eye’, but rather with the role of the passions 
in the person’s deliberations and sense of herself.  I’m not always certain that I understand this  
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criticism, partly because I say so little about the passions in A&E (perhaps that is the criticism), 
so I will have to approach this in stages by responding to the way Corbi sets up his problem.  He 
begins by saying that “under the label ‘transparency condition’ Moran mixes up a trivial and a 
non-trivial constraint”.  In Chapter Two, I define the transparency condition as a norm 
concerning the relation between two kinds of question a person may ask herself: “The claim then 
is that a first-person present-tense question about one's belief is answered by reference to (or 
consideration of) the same reasons as would justify an answer to the corresponding question 
about the world.” (p. 62) Corbi considers the relation between two questions:   
 
    (2a) ‘Do I believe that P?’  
 
    (2b) ‘Is P true?’   
 
And after describing the deliberative attitude toward (2a), such that the person is asking herself 
this question in the course of trying to making of her mind whether to believe P, he says: 
 
  “This transparency condition just highlights a conceptual connection 
between (2a) and (2b), when the former is raised in a deliberative manner. And 
this condition is trivial insofar as an agent cannot fail to satisfy it, given that the 
capacity to adopt a deliberative attitude is constitutive of being an agent.”   
 
 
While I would agree that the capacity to adopt a deliberative attitude is constitutive of being an 
agent, actual agents can fall short in various ways of the demands that define them.  There seem 
to be several ways in which the answers to (2a) and (2b) can diverge.  Without assuming any 
irrationality, a person can simply be wrong in her belief that P, in which case (2a) and (2b) have 
different answers.  A rational believer will know that her believing P is not equivalent to the truth 
of P itself, that these represent different facts, one about her as a believer and another one about 
something else in the world.  To fail to recognize this would be a form of solipsism.  At the same 
time, a rational believer knows that her believing P is her commitment to the truth of P, and that 
is why the logic of belief obliges her to conform to the Transparency condition.  In the book I try 
to describe various ways in which an agent’s conformity to this condition can be compromised or 
partial (such cases are perhaps easier to make out in the case of attitudes other than belief, 
including emotions of various kinds).  Finally, even when a question of the first sort is being 
considered in a deliberative spirit, so that the question the person faces is ‘Am I to believe P?’, or 
‘Should I regret what happened?’, it is not guaranteed by logic that the question is answered as 
equivalent to ‘Is P true?’ or ‘Is what happened regrettable?’.  From another perspective attitudes 
are themselves states of affairs, or conditions of the person, and there may be reasons of more 
than one kind that recommend having this attitude.  It may be irrational or even impossible 
consciously to adopt a belief for practical reasons, but the fact that being a P-believer can be 
assessed practically as well as epistemically means that the equivalence of questions like (2a) 
and (2b) is not empty.  (On the relation of kinds of reason for belief, see Pamela Hieronymi, ‘The 
Wrong Kind of Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 9, Sept. 2005.) 
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  We get closer to the heart of Corbi’s criticism in a passage near the middle of his article, 
which makes it clear that the Cartesianism he has in mind has less to do with the supposed 
infallibility of introspection, and more to do with whether the passions can be seen as integral to 
the self or as alien intruders, and the question of the role of ‘external’ means of altering one’s 
attitudes.  I’ll need to quote a moderately lengthy passage before making a few responses. 
 
  “My problem is that I don’t think Moran provides an adequate elucidation 
of the resources that are available to the deliberative agent in shaping his life. For, 
in my view, he is still trapped by the Cartesian Model of the self. Despite his 
claims on the contrary, Moran interprets the deliberative attitude too much in 
connection to the traditional role ascribed to the effort of the will. The agent must 
appeal to the effort of the will to carry out his decisions and keep his 
commitments. The theoretical attitude is concerned, by contrast, with the 
discovery of passions that somehow the will must counteract. This leads Moran to 
treat indirect ways of making one’s psychological attitudes more responsive to 
one’s deliberation as the result of adopting a theoretical attitude towards oneself. 
It is like moving one’s right arm with one’s left hand, instead of raising it directly. 
I think, however, that there are indirect ways of altering one’s psychological states 
and dispositions which form a part of the deliberative attitude and play a crucial 
role in the agent’s psychic health ”  
 
I have some trouble recognizing my own view in this account, for I don’t claim anywhere that 
the “effort of the will” is involved in ordinary deliberation or in making up one’s mind, nor do I 
conceive of the theoretical attitude as concerned with “the discovery of passions that somehow 
the will must counteract”.  Why should the relation of the will to the passions be understood in 
terms of counteracting them, rather than furthering them, developing them, learning from them?  
While it is often true that “the agent must appeal to the effort of the will to carry out his decisions 
and keep his commitments”, this will only be true for certain decisions, those that are difficult to 
carry out or which we are tempted to abandon.  Most of our decisions and commitments are not 
like this, however, and the decision to get a newspaper or leave work early today does not 
require any appeal to the effort of the will.  More importantly, even if some decisions require an 
effort of the will to carry them out, I don’t think that any effort of the will as such is involved in 
the ordinary forming of decisions or commitments of the sort discussed in my book.  For there I 
am concerned to distinguish a theoretical question which is answered by the discovery of a desire 
or a belief from a deliberative question whose answer is the formation of a desire or a belief.  In 
a theoretical context I am seeking to discover what it is that I desire, what it is that has been 
moving me, whereas in a deliberative context I am trying to figure out what to desire, or what to 
think about something.  In this latter kind of case I may be thinking about how to handle a 
situation with a friend, and come to the conclusion “No, on balance, I don’t want to tell him what 
a reader said about his manuscript.”  My immediate point here is that coming to this conclusion 
does not require any effort of the will on my part.  The conclusion I reach is my desire; it is not a 
conclusion that I now have to figure out some way to implement, some way to make this 
conclusion my desire.    
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  This brings us to the question of indirect means.  For me it is characteristic of the 
immediacy of ordinary self-knowledge that when a deliberative question arrives at an answer 
(‘This is what I want, what I think, how I feel ...”) there is no further thing the person needs to do 
to make this conclusion her belief or her desire, no steps she needs to take to implement this 
decision, as she would need to do if her deliberations were about what someone else should think 
or feel.  She is not acting upon herself anymore than she is when she simply raises her arm.  This 
was the point of the comparison with the two ways of moving one’s arm that Corbi refers to.  
And here he raises some questions about the role of such ‘indirect means’ within a deliberative 
stance that take the discussion further and for which I am grateful.  First of all, it was never my 
intention to deny that such indirect means may be necessary in order to restore psychic health, 
just as someone trying to quit smoking may need to employ external aids and not simply rely on 
her decision to quit.  But when it is a question of my relation to my own attitudes, the need to 
employ external means to inculcate some attitude in oneself is symptomatic of the fact that the 
ordinary route of coming to a new attitude about X by reflecting on X itself has proved 
ineffective or unstable.  Without something interfering with one’s relation to X itself, there 
would be no need to employ external means.  In a given situation it may well be part of my 
general deliberative stance that I realize that in this case I need to employ such external means to 
adjust or stabilize my attitude toward something, and here I take it that I am in agreement with 
Corbi.  But in doing so, my orientation to myself becomes more like my orientation toward 
another person:  in seeking to influence my own thought or behavior here, I have to consider 
what will work, what will be effective, and I have to observe the results of my interventions.  It is 
not that there is anything wrong with any of this; it is just that in such a situation the person 
cannot speak with first-person authority about her attitude because that question must wait upon 
the results of her interventions.   
 
  Perhaps I have not been as clear as I should be that not all our engagements with the 
world (our ‘attitudes’ in the broadest possible sense) are subject to a deliberative stance in the 
same way, or perhaps not at all, and therefore not all of our attitudes are ones for which the 
person has any first-person authority.  My aim in the book was to account for how there could be 
any such thing as first-person authority, beginning with the most straightforward case of simple 
belief, and using the structure developed there to shed light on those less transparently 
‘cognitive’ areas of life where that structure will apply only with more or less strain.  Here I find 
very sympathetic various things Corbi says about the element of passivity involved in such 
activities as following a mathematical demonstration, altering one’s perceptual beliefs, or 
following a piece of music.  Hence I would agree with him in rejecting the following picture:   
 
  “For the Cartesian, passions are just facts about the agent which may 
favour or hurdle his capacity to approach his own telos. But, in any case, the 
agent’s passions play no role in articulating his telos. They are just facts, like 
external facts, on which the agent must count in order to fix the most appropriate 
means to reach his goals. Passions have, then, a merely instrumental relation to 
the agent’s telos. To put it another way, the agent identifies himself with his telos, 
his true self is the one that pursues that telos. And, within the Cartesian Model,  
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passions do not form a part of his true self, they bear a mere instrumental (quite 
often disturbing) relation to it.”  
 
   
In contrast to this, Corbi points to the sense in which some forms of passivity are creative for the 
self and not simply ‘facticities’ to be worked around or manipulated.  And this is surely right, but 
it is important to distinguish forms of passivity and forms of responsiveness here. On the one 
hand there is the passivity of taking a pill and waiting for it to take effect.  And on the other hand 
there is being passively receptive to some passion or affect whose sense is not immediately 
apparent to conscious reflection, and one may need to allow oneself to be carried along in order 
to see what sense there is in it.  In this latter case, what one is passive to is something with its 
own normative structure, the way a mathematical demonstration has its own normative structure.  
In that case ‘passivity’ means that the norms in question may not reveal themselves to what we 
might think of as ‘deliberation’, but require something more like giving oneself over to the 
activity and attempting to be guided by it.  Unlike the case of taking a pill, however, this form of 
passivity is the flip side of a form of activity, since without the active engagement of forms of 
attentiveness and absorption the passivity in question has nothing to do with the receptiveness or 
creativity Corbi is drawing attention to.  (I take it that this more or less fits with Corbi’s 
distinction between ‘low passivity’ and ‘receptive passivity’.  I say more about the understanding 
of passivity in such contexts in ‘Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental 
Life’, in Contours of Agency: Essays for Harry Frankfurt; edited by Sarah Buss and Lee 
Overton (MIT 2001)).   
               
  
  Komarine Romdenh-Romluc considers three ways of making sense of the idea of 
unconscious beliefs and finds difficulties with all of them, and then goes on to suggest that 
progress here can be made by rejecting the idea that “all beliefs can be analyzed as attitudes to 
propositions”.  It is the rejection of this thought which she associates with the phenomenological 
tradition.  I find myself in sympathy with much of what she says, but naturally I have a few 
questions about how she sets up the problem.  So let’s begin by considering the three approaches 
to the problem that she begins by considering and rejecting.  First, we might take an unconscious 
belief to be one that is unconsciously endorsed by the subject.  This is not a promising approach 
if ‘endorsing’ a proposition involves ‘entertaining’ it (considering it for approval, as it were).  
For entertaining a proposition would seem to be a conscious mental activity, and “No sense can 
be given to the claim that a subject entertains a proposition unconsciously”.  A second option for 
understanding unconscious belief appeals to “two disunified centers of consciousness within the 
same person”.  This approach is rejected because it “cannot explain all types of unconscious 
belief”, specifically the rapidly-evolving beliefs (perceptual and otherwise) that are involved in 
the execution of a complex skill.   Finally, a third approach explains unconscious beliefs as 
components of the mind understood as an information-processing system.  Since information-
systems need not be conscious, and yet are often credited with states like beliefs, we might in 
principle understand unconscious beliefs along these lines.  However, this approach is rejected as 
well since it cannot account for how therapy could be possible to restore the belief’s accessibility 
to consciousness.  As Romdenh-Romluc puts it,   
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  “However, if my suppressed belief is a component of an information 
processing system, therapy could not restore my authority over it, because 
information-processing systems are the wrong kind of things to have this kind of 
authority over.  It follows that suppressed beliefs cannot be understood as 
components of information-processing systems, without giving up the possibility 
of therapy.” 
 
It is in response to the difficulties encountered by these various approaches that she then 
recommends that we consider motor-skills as analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and others, seeing 
them as pre-reflective beliefs about the world which need not involve conscious reflection to 
guide the subject through the environment.    
 
  There is much that I find myself in sympathy with here, but at the same time I was not 
always sure whose account this was supposed to be a problem for.  I take it that there are several 
ways in which someone’s belief might fail to be conscious.  To begin with, there is a great 
variety among what we commonly call beliefs themselves, and therefore a comparable variety in 
the modes of self-knowledge that may apply to them.  Beliefs can be more or less explicit and 
determinate, more or less language-dependent, and more or less easy or resistant to conscious 
awareness.  And there will be differences in what counts as conscious awareness.  I have beliefs 
about how one singer’s performance compares to another, but it may be difficult for me to put 
them into words.  There are certain perceptual beliefs which may be perfectly accessible to me, 
but which I am only able to indicate by heavy reliance on demonstrative expressions (“The taste 
is more like this; not so much like that”).  I have beliefs about how to get to my home from 
across town which guide me on my way, but if I have to give verbal directions to another person 
I have to engage not only my access to my beliefs but my ability to put them into words.  The 
beliefs themselves may not be sentence-like at all, and more like a map or general orientation.  
And there are beliefs which are of the familiar, verbal, type that philosophers are more 
comfortable taking as examples, but which a person may never have formulated for herself.  
What are commonly called ‘tacit beliefs’ are of this sort.  There may be every reason to attribute 
to someone the belief that his car is not edible even if this belief has never occurred to her.  This 
is some of the variety of beliefs we commonly take people to have.  Is a person normally self-
aware of all such beliefs?  I don’t think so, and in any case I think we will want to say that self-
knowledge is going to be a different sort of thing in these different cases.  In some cases, but not 
all, we will not want to credit someone with self-knowledge of her belief if she cannot tell us 
what it is.  In other cases, self-knowledge of an essentially non-verbal belief may manifest itself 
non-verbally as well.  In a parallel way, what it is for a belief to be unconscious will mean 
different things in different cases, depending on whether the belief is unconscious because tacit, 
or because the belief resists verbal formulation, or because it is explicit but repressed, or because 
it is part of the exercise of a complex skill whose performance does not require explicit reflection 
(or where explicit reflection may interfere with performance).   
 
  For these and other reasons, I don’t think it is plausible that we should seek a uniform 
account of unconscious beliefs.  As to the first option discussed by Romdenh-Romluc, I am in  
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full agreement that it will not help to think of unconscious beliefs of any sort as those which are 
unconsciously endorsed by the subject.  The verbal belief that one’s car is not edible is not 
conscious, but not because it is unconsciously endorsed by the subject.  We are assuming that a 
tacit belief like this never occurred to the person in the first place, let alone was something 
considered for approval (consciously or unconsciously) and then endorsed.  And the non-verbal 
beliefs that orient a person in the performance of some skill may also be unconscious, but not 
because they have been endorsed unconsciously.  Such beliefs are still subject to correction and 
adjustment in the course of exercising the skill, but this does not require explicit reflection upon 
them.  This brings us to the second option discussed, the idea that unconscious beliefs can be 
understood by reference to  “two disunified centers of consciousness within the same person”.   
A model of this sort has been developed by Donald Davidson in his account of self-deception 
and other forms of irrationality, and one version of it or another can be found in much 
psychoanalytic and psychological theory.  As the reference to irrationality suggests, models of 
this sort are suggested by cases of beliefs, desire, or other attitudes which not only fail to be 
conscious on a given occasion, but which stubbornly resist being brought to consciousness, and 
which are actively repudiated by the person when they are offered as making the best sense of 
what they say and do and feel.  For this reason, I did not understand the nature of the criticism of 
a model of this sort when Romdenh-Romluc rejects it because “it cannot explain all types of 
unconscious belief”.  For the sense in which a set of beliefs (perceptual and otherwise) which is 
engaged in the interception of a ball in the course of a game of football is unconscious is very 
different from the sense of ‘unconscious’ that applies to suppressed beliefs and desires which a 
person is unable to acknowledge.  In cases of this latter sort, it is the resistance to awareness 
itself that suggests the idea of divisions within the mind, and not the fact of the absence of 
explicit consciousness by itself.  Since I take the model of divisions within the mind to be 
addressed to a different set of phenomena, I don’t see it as a failing that it does not apply to the 
sense of unconsciousness that applies to the ways in which a person orients herself in the pursuit 
of a bodily skill.  The very notions of ‘belief’ and ‘unconscious’ are utterly different in the two 
cases (and I expect that Romdenh-Romluc would agree with this).   
 
  Finally, the third option for understanding unconscious beliefs is described as conceiving 
them as “components of information-processing systems”.  Here we might think that the general 
computational model of the mind would fare better than the previous two options both because 
such a model is entirely general (and hence should apply to the invocation of belief in any 
context, whether verbal, non-verbal, tacit, suppressed, etc,.) and also because such models do not 
build in consciousness to the very identification of belief itself.  However, this model is also 
found wanting because “this conception of suppressed belief rules out the possibility of therapy.”  
The reason for this is given as follows:   
 
  “If my suppressed belief is a component of an information processing 
system, therapy could not restore my authority over it, because information-
processing systems are the wrong kind of things to have this kind of authority 
over.  It follows that suppressed beliefs cannot be understood as components of 
information-processing systems, without giving up the possibility of therapy.” 
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We may be understanding the commitments of such an information-processing model differently 
but I would have thought that it was the very generality of such a model that made an objection 
of this type inappropriate.  That is, I don’t mean to assume that there can be no objections to a 
computational theory of the mind, and such objections may be empirical as much as 
philosophical.  But such a theory is intended as a representation of the ordinary phenomena of, 
e.g., believing that it’s about to rain, or seeing an approaching object and moving to avoid it, or 
learning the way out of a room.  The fact that such a model proceeds at what is called a ‘sub-
personal’ level of description means that it seeks to give an explanation of such phenomena as 
believing, seeing, or learning, an explanation that does not invoke such terms themselves.  This 
is different from denying the phenomena of believing, seeing, or learning, and it is different from 
claiming that a true account of human life will have no room for such concepts.  As I understand 
it anyway, the information-processing model is a difference in level of description, an 
explanatory framework, and not equivalent to eliminating reference to what is being explained.  
And while the processes invoked in such a framework may be as different from the ordinary 
concepts of believing and learning as the language of physiology or mechanics is different from 
the language we use to describe someone as running and kicking a ball, in neither case need the 
sub-personal concepts be seen as replacements for the ordinary ones.  The nerves and muscles of 
a person’s body do not themselves run or kick, but they are what make running and kicking 
possible.  Likewise, the adoption of an information-processing model of the mind does not rule 
out the possibility of therapy or its effects, but is an attempt (successful or not) to account for 
such phenomena.  (Whether such a model is philosophically or empirically defensible is another 
question.)   
 
  In addition, if “information-processing systems are the wrong kind of things to have this 
kind of authority over”, then this makes me wonder about the positive recommendation in terms 
of shifting attention to the pre-reflective level of bodily coping.  For the very reason that the 
exercise of such skills is pre-reflective it would seem not to be the sort of thing over which a 
person has anything resembling first-person authority.  The pre-reflective awareness that makes 
it possible for someone to ride a bicycle successfully may well be something about which the 
person has no special awareness at all.  That is, with regard to the exercise of such skills a person 
often has no idea at all how she is able to do what she does, or even much of an idea just what 
she is doing (e.g., whether she turns by leaning or by turning the handlebars, etc.).  These would 
not seem to be dimensions of life where a person is credited with first-person authority, since 
even in the normal case, self-knowledge here may well be dependent on self-observation and 
corrected by the better-placed observations made by other people.  Naturally, in various 
situations this authority lapses in the case of self-knowledge of ordinary attitudes too, but it is 
ordinarily assumed that when this is so, there is some defect in the rationality of the attitude in 
question and in A&E I tried to present an account of first-person authority that would make sense 
of its presumed connection to rationality.  The case of motor-skills seems different in this regard 
as well, since in many instances of the exercise of a skill (and not only physical skills, but social 
skills as well) not only is the person not expected to “know her own mind” with the immediacy 
and authority associated with beliefs and other attitudes, but self-consciousness itself is just as 
likely to play an interfering as an enabling role in the exercise of the skill.   
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  So I have some trouble making out how the appeal to the pre-reflective level of motor 
skills is to help with the philosophical problems of unconscious or suppressed beliefs and the 
ordinary assumption of first-person authority.  I agree that something like the belief that my 
brother is my parents’ favorite child may be pre-reflective in the sense of never having been 
explicitly formulated and an attitude which expresses itself in patterns of behavior (but also: 
patterns of thought, association, and feeling).  And I can certainly see how a pre-reflective 
attitude like this may conflict with what the person would consciously avow.  In such a case, 
however, it may well be the avowed belief that needs correcting, not the pre-reflective one 
(which may express something closer to the truth of the situation).  If so, and if the pre-reflective 
belief is a form of absorbed coping with the world, then it is not clear why there should be any 
need for it to be accessible to explicit consciousness, anymore than in the case of someone riding 
a bicycle.  Such explicit consciousness may be unavailable for reasons that do not suggest 
anything amiss in the exercise of the skill itself.  By contrast, I would argue, the unconscious 
beliefs that pose a problem for philosophical accounts of self-knowledge are those for which 
there is an ordinary assumption of first-person authority, an assumption that is grounded in the 
relation between the avowability of the attitude and its rationality.  These would be primarily 
those propositional attitudes which are suppressed for one reason or another, where this 
suppression impairs the integration of the attitude within the rest of the person, rather than those 
pre-reflective attitudes and orientations whose absence from consciousness is part of their normal 
good functioning.   
 
 
  Josep Prades has given me much to think about in his challenging paper, and I am sure 
that there are aspects of his total view that I am not understanding correctly.  I am pleased to find 
that we are in agreement about a number of issues where much contemporary philosophy of 
action and practical reason takes a different tack, particularly in his rejection of the Humean-
Davidsonian assumption that action explanation must always bottom out in reference to the 
causal interaction of psychological states, viz. the pairing of a belief and a pro-attitude (or desire 
in the broad sense).  Prades defends a more austerely teleological account of action explanation 
with which I am broadly in sympathy, but he disagrees with me in claiming that in specifying the 
reason for some action we are simply giving a description of its goal, and not justifying it in any 
interesting sense.  Nor, according to him, need the agent who describes the goal of her action be 
conceiving of that goal as good or worth pursuing in any sense.  ‘Content Specifying’ (or CS) 
reasons are just redescriptions of the goal of action and have no (further) normative work to do.   
 
  I have some questions to raise about how to understand the explanatory work done by CS 
reasons if we divorce them from any conception of the goal as something good or worth 
pursuing, but first I want to address a related point, in connection with a criticism Prades makes 
near the beginning of his paper.  In characterizing my account as “an extremely rationalistic 
account of intentional action:”, Prades says the following:   
 
  “the particular strategy that Moran follows seems to force him to accept 
the conclusion that any case of action against the agent's best reasons -or the 
reasons the agents thinks are her best reasons- is a case in which the agent's self- 
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knowledge is impaired. As a general principle this does not seem to be true. I can 
calmly and lucidly decide to eat a chocolate cake against my best reasons without 
any obvious deficiency in my self-knowledge” 
 
In one sense I have to agree here.  If I am asked ‘Why did you eat the whole cake?’, my reply 
may be: ‘It was delicious’.  That answer is a manifestation of self-knowledge, insofar as this 
answer points to a different reason for the action than would be given by the answer, ‘Because I 
had promised my mother to do so’.  But if I give the first answer, then in the context in which we 
are imagining it this naturally raises a follow-up question:  ‘Yes, I’m sure it was delicious, but 
you admit that you also had overwhelming reason not to eat it.  And now you regret it, as you 
knew you would.  So why did you do that?’   And to this I may have no answer.   
 
  Now “reasons come to an end somewhere”, as someone once said, and it need not be seen 
as a defect of ordinary self-knowledge if the person’s answers to the question ‘why?’ give out at 
some point.  But I was thinking of the connection between self-knowledge and acting in 
accordance with what one judge’s best in a somewhat different way, one that comes out better in 
thinking about a future-directed case than about reflection on a just completed action.  I say that 
there are two forms of self-knowledge, Attribution and Avowal.  Attribution will be based on 
observation and evidence of the same kind that grounds knowledge of other people.  In a given 
case, self-knowledge through Attribution may be superior to that reached through Avowal; 
superior in the sense of being better confirmed, a better predictor. But the person herself does not 
speak with any special authority about knowledge gained through Attribution.  Self-knowledge 
through Avowal, by contrast, is the self-knowledge that has interested philosophers in being both 
‘immediate’, that is, not based on observation or evidence, and the basis for the special authority 
that attaches to certain expressions of self-knowledge.  The primary questions here are why there 
should be any difference in knowledge available from the first-person and the third-person points 
of view, and how it could be that the fact of not being grounded in observation or evidence could 
somehow contribute to the authority of this form of self-knowledge rather than detract from it.   
   
  Knowledge of my more immediate intentional actions is normally grounded in my 
decision to do this or that.  These decisions needn’t be explicit or discrete, but the way I know 
where I will be next week is in virtue of my general plans, and not by way of a prediction about 
what is likely to happen to me (as a prisoner may know where he will be next week).  The akratic 
gambler has decided not to go to the gaming tables tonight, this decision being based on his 
lively apprehension of disaster awaiting him if he does so.  The decision not to go would 
normally be expressed in the simple declarative sentence “I’m not going, it’s not worth it”, 
which would express his knowledge about his future action.  But of course he knows himself in 
another way as well.  He knows from experience that his past resolutions on this subject have not 
counted for anything much.  When he comes to his lively apprehension of the disaster awaiting 
him and confidently declares “I’m not going”, no one believes him.  And when he considers the 
matter, he has to admit that they are right to dismiss his words. When he makes this avowal, he’s 
not speaking from knowledge, for what he says is not even true.  It is in this sense that I have 
claimed that the akratic person lacks a certain form of self-knowledge.  With regard to gambling, 
this person has lost the right and the ability to know what he is going to do by deciding on a  
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course of action.  (To anticipate, this thought is related to some of Carla Bagnoli’s thoughts on 
authority and the second-person.)   Of course he may know in another way what he is really 
likely to do, based on experience and the evidence of his past behavior, and this will undoubtedly 
be an important form of knowledge for him to have.  But knowledge of one’s beliefs, fears, and 
future actions through avowal no small thing to lose, nor is it something whose loss could be 
made up for in other ways.  It is, I have argued elsewhere in A&E, the primary way an agent 
knows such things about herself, and it is intimately connected with the rationality of the actions 
and attitudes that are known in this way.  And what he knows about what he is likely to do 
through experience does not come with the immediacy or first-person authority that have made 
this form of self-knowledge of philosophical interest.  His friends and family may know much 
better than he does here.   
  None of this means that when he is there at the gaming tables laying down his money he 
doesn’t know what he is doing.  Nor does it mean that if asked why he is there he cannot speak 
lyrically and informatively about the genuine attractions, even the genuine satisfactions, of this 
activity.  Akrasia is not like acting in a trance, nor is the person in this state unable to tell us what 
they are doing or why it seemed compelling, even a good idea.  With this reference to a “good 
idea”, however, we come closer to Prades’ main line of criticism, which is stated early in the 
paper in the following terms:   
 
  “In my opinion, the Anscombe-Moran principle that intentional action 
requires a “primary reason” could only be true under a teleological reading of 
“reason”: to specify such a reason is just to specify the purpose, the goal of the 
action. By itself, this notion of primary reason does not guarantee any kind of 
relevant justification: it has nothing to do with considering that the goal is “choice 
worthy” or “good”.” 
 
  Here I’m pretty sure that we disagree.  I think that even a purely teleological sense of 
reason must answer to some notion of the choice-worthy or good.  Prades also does not agree 
with the claim that desire is connected with finding the object of desire good or choice worthy in 
some sense. At one point he says that “the obvious fact that a desire is not a simple disposition, 
does not ground the conclusion that a desire is a disposition for something that is considered as 
worthy.”  And it is true that this consideration alone does not show that desire ‘aims at’ 
something considered good or worth pursuing.  But other well-known considerations do seem to 
point us in this direction, and I don’t see how Prades has addressed them.  One set of 
considerations begins by taking account of the distinction between ‘brute’ or appetitive desires 
and ‘judgment-sensitive’ desires.  Brute desires like thirst or fatigue or thirst may be connected 
with no judgment whatsoever, let alone a judgement of goodness or choice worthiness.  A desire 
of this sort is not a possible conclusion of any deliberation.  A judgment-sensitive desire, on the 
other hand, is of the right logical type to be the possible conclusion of deliberation.  In thinking 
over a trip I plan to take, I can arrive at the conclusion that I don’t want to take the train after all, 
that I really want to fly.  Now it is true that to claim this difference in logical type between the 
two types of desire is not yet to say that the object of judgment-sensitive desire has to be 
conceived in terms of goodness or choice worthiness.  But without the appeal to something good  
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or choice worthy about flying over taking the train I don’t see how we can make sense of the 
ordinary deliberative formation of desires like this.   
  Prades agrees with Anscombe  that it belongs to any intentional action that it is subject to 
certain forms of the question ‘why?’, and that the answer to such question will elucidate the goal 
or purpose of the action.  However he acknowledges this in a restrictive way:   
 
  “The grain of truth behind the idea that intentional action is (normally) 
action for reasons, is that intentional action accepts certain paradigmatic why-
questions, questions that ask the agent to specify the content of the intention-with-
which she acts.” 
 
What is noteworthy is that this reference to the applicability of ‘Why?’ questions does not 
mention goodness or anything else normative as part of the answer to such a question, and this 
omission is deliberate. Part of the reason for Prades’ balking here may be the thought that 
Anscombe’s thesis is tied to a certain philosophical picture of the kind of goodness in question, a 
traditional invocation of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.  But I take it that goodness, like 
reasons themselves, comes in many different varieties and grades of value, and that these are not 
all commensurable with each other.  A desire need not be taken to be aiming at something 
especially ennobling for it to conform to Anscombe’s requirement.  What we may think of as 
perverse desires still conceive of their objects in ways that specify what is found choice worthy 
in them.  I may be ashamed of my desire for something, because I take it not only to be a desire 
for something both trivial and disgusting, but more, to be a desire for that thing specifically 
because it is both trivial and disgusting, something I desire under its aspect as trivial and 
disgusting; and yet I still acknowledge it as my own.  But this is not so much to deny the 
connection between desire and some assessment of the characteristics of the object that make it 
desirable, as rather a reason to broaden and deepen our sense of what such an assessment can be, 
and how it can provide the coloring and descriptive content of a desire.  For surely some 
activity's disgusting character can be just what appeals to someone and makes the pursuit of it 
alluring, even rewarding, even if it conflicts with other values of his.  What would seem, to me 
anyway, to leave the character of desire behind is if the object were pursued under no aspect at 
all, with nothing in its presentation to the agent (consciously or unconsciously) under which it is 
somehow appealing 
   
  Part of what makes me wonder whether a broader notion of ‘reason’ or ‘justification’ 
would bring our positions closer together are passages like the following:   
  “What does not follow, pace Moran and many other anti-Humean 
accounts, is that CS reasons are necessarily justificatory in any interesting and 
practical sense: normally their only justificatory role is to refine the description of 
the intention with which the agent acts: an intention can be re-described by 
appealing to certain CS reasons.” 
 
If CS reasons are not justificatory in any interesting sense, then there would seem to be no 
difference between an answer to the ‘Why’ question of the sort “I did it to save time”, on the one 
hand, and “My hand slipped”, on the other.  Or else: if CS reasons are nonetheless teleological,  
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specifying the goal of action (i.e., the way that saying ‘My hand slipped’ does not specify a 
goal), then I don’t see how they fail to present justification for the action.  In specifying the goal 
of my action of walking across the room (“to close the window”) I do two things.  I make sense 
of my walking across the room.  I show that it didn’t just happen, but that there was a point to it.  
And secondly, in specifying my CS reason (“to close the window”) I invite the further question 
“And what is the point of that?” or “What is the good of it?”.  We may be disagreeing about what 
counts as justification in an interesting sense, since to my mind an answer to this question such 
as “It was getting cold” or even “I just felt like it” count as justifications, and serve to 
characterize the goal as in some sense worth pursuing.  In daily life our justifications, like our 
goals, are not always terribly interesting, but the philosophical point is to distinguish the different 
forms of explanation, and to characterize the specific demands that are made on the 
understanding of an event when we see it as a human action.   
  
  At the same time, something that I think keeps our positions apart is the fact that I don’t 
see Prades’ account as trying to display the coordination between the reasons that explain 
someone’s action and the reasons the agent himself considers when she is considering whether to 
pursue one course of action rather than another.  At one point Prades says that ‘“the reasons for 
which an agent acts (insofar as normal intentional action requires such reasons) do not have the 
role of justifying the agent when she makes her mind up. For those reasons are just the content of 
her decision.”, and here I have to confess to not understanding the claim.  For when the agent is 
making up her mind and deciding how to act, how can the reasons she arrives at not present 
themselves to her as justifying reasons?  If she is making up her mind about what to do, how 
could she not be engaged in looking for reasons that would justify one course of action over 
another?  To insist on this much seems to me perfectly consistent with thinking of reasons for 
action as ‘CS reasons’ in the sense specified by Prades.  The answer to the ‘Why question’ need 
not itself mention either desires themselves or anything normative for the content of the answer 
to be functioning as a justifying reason for the action in question.  (“because tomorrow is the last 
day of the Caravaggio exhibition”).  But at the same time, what is presented as the CS reason still 
has to present itself to the deliberating agent as something it makes sense to pursue (in the 
broadest sense).  For consider the response if the agent is told that she is mistaken, that tomorrow 
is not the last day of the Caravaggio exhibition, that in fact the show closed last week.  If this 
doesn’t make a difference to the agent, then I can’t see how it was functioning as a CS reason in 
the first place.  And it seems clear that the reason this news must make a difference to the agent 
is that she has now lost her stated reason for finding the trip to Barcelona to be a good or a 
sensible idea.   
 
  Toward the end of the paper, Prades responds to this sort of consideration as follows:   
 
  “It cannot survive my abandonment of the plan of living in Paris, when I 
learn that in fact I will not receive the expected funding. All right. Nevertheless, 
this is just a particular case of what I described before as CS reasons: to say that I 
want to learn French is an incomplete description of my attitude that is refined 
when I say that I want to learn French as my chosen way of having a happier life 
in Paris. I want to go to the station now, because I want to go to Barcelona: my  
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going to the station is only a part of my intention. The intention is better specified 
by describing it as my chosen way of going to Barcelona.  
 
  In such a case we would certainly need an explanation of what is meant by saying that the 
intention is “better specified” when the description comes to include something seen as good or 
desirable by the agent.  “Better specified” cannot simply mean ‘more precise’ or ‘more 
predictive’.  Further, when Prades says that his goal of learning French “cannot survive my 
abandonment of the plan of living in Paris, when I learn that in fact I will not receive the 
expected funding”, we need an explanation of why this goal cannot survive this change of plans.  
Ordinarily (so I would claim) we would explain the fact that the goal of learning French cannot 
survive this change of plans because it was the integration of this goal within this larger plan that 
made it seem a good or worthwhile thing to do.  With the loss of that integration, the goal of 
learning French no longer seems (as) worthwhile to him, and that is why this goal cannot survive 
the change of plans.  Prades, however, cannot avail himself of any such explanation for why the 
original goal cannot survive the abandonment of the plan to live in Paris, which leaves me 
wondering what other sort of explanation he could have in mind.   
 
  As I said earlier, my confession of failure to understand is not simply the standard 
philosophical gesture in these contexts.  I am quite sure that there is more to Prades’ total view 
than I have been able to profit from so far, and some of my questions express my certainty that I 
am not understanding his account correctly.  But I am impressed with the radical re-orientation 
of the understanding of action and practical reason that he is recommending here and in his 
larger work on the subject, and I look forward to learning more from it.   
 
   
  The title of Hilan Bensusan’s paper points to some questions he raises toward the end of 
his paper, about the role of justification in our thinking about our beliefs, and whether this role 
belongs primarily with the first-person or third-person point of view.  In this he is suggesting a 
possible parallel between a thought of Bernard Williams’ to the effect that certain categories of 
moral thought belong to the external evaluation of an agent or an action, and have only 
problematic application within the thinking of the agent herself.  Bensusan suggests a parallel 
claim with respect to the role of epistemic categories of appraisal, and suggests that there is a 
similar problem with their having a central guiding role in the thinking of the epistemic agent 
herself.   
 
  Much of the argument concerns the understanding of ‘transparency’ as that idea appears 
in the account of self-knowledge in A&E, so I will begin there.  Drawing on a theme in 
Wittgenstein, which is taken up later by Roy Edgley and then Gareth Evans, I define 
‘transparency’ as a relation between two sets of questions; a question about oneself (“What is it 
that I believe here?”) and a question about the world (“What is in fact the case out there?”).  In 
the passage from p. 62 that I quote in my response to Josep Corbi, I define the ‘transparency’ of 
one question to another one as the relation between them such that one question (about my own 
belief) can be answered by consideration of the very same reasons that would justify an answer 
to the world-directed question.  I then go on to claim that it is a norm of belief that a person  
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should be able to answer the question of what he believes about something (i.e., a question of the 
first sort) by consideration of the reasons relevant to answering the parallel question about the 
facts themselves.  I go into this here because at various important places in his paper, Bensusan 
is employing a sense of ‘transparency’ quite different from this, and this makes it difficult to tell 
to what extent his conclusions are to be derived from the sort of account I am presenting.  Near 
the beginning of Bensusan’s paper there is the following:   
   
  “Because my beliefs are transparent, I can avow what I believe with no 
appeal either to anybody’s behaviour or to my internal makeup. My own 
knowledge of my beliefs has this special channel of access that involves the 
transparency of the world to me; of course, I can find out about my beliefs in 
much the same manner I use to discover what other people believe but transparent 
access to the world is an alternative, first-personal road that takes me only to my 
own beliefs.”  
 
In this passage there is reference to the transparency of one’s beliefs (“Because my beliefs are 
transparent”), as well as reference to “the transparency of the world to me”.  I think these are 
ideas that have their home in epistemic theories of a different sort (such as arguments about 
direct realism), and they do not have straightforward application to the issues I am dealing with 
in A&E.  (But I will try to say more about this in a moment.)  In any case, the way I am 
employing the notion of ‘transparency’ in my book only makes sense as a relation between sets 
of questions, and as such this notion of transparency does not have any clear application of the 
idea to my relation to my beliefs themselves or my relation to the world.  Perhaps when 
Bensusan speaks of ‘my beliefs being transparent’ this should just be taken to mean that I know 
them with a special immediacy.  But if so, then this threatens to confuse the strategy of 
explanation that I am attempting in the book, for the idea that my beliefs are known to me 
‘immediately’ is one of the primary phenomena that I am trying to explain, and specifically to 
explain by reference to the norm of transparency of one set of questions to another set.  Hence if 
‘transparency’ meant the same thing in both contexts my account would be no explanation at all, 
since it would only be re-stating the phenomena to be explained.  This difference between our 
understandings of the term ‘transparency’ will also be relevant when we consider his idea of 
beliefs which are “not transparent enough”.   
  First, a word about “double access” and normativity.  Much of the argument of my book 
is taken up with the claim that there is a fundamental difference between knowing an attitude of 
mine because I can attribute it to myself (on the basis of behavior or other evidence) and 
knowing an attitude of mine because I can avow it, that is, overtly express it as mine without 
reliance on behavioral or other evidence.  It is self-knowledge through avowal, I claim, that is the 
form of self-knowledge that has attracted philosophical interest, and which exhibits a difference 
between first and third-person cases.  A question I press across a couple of chapters is: why 
should the normal route of self-knowledge through avowal matter, either to rationality or to what 
we think of as ordinary self-knowledge?  Why wouldn’t a form of attribution that was just as 
immediate and reliable be just as good?  It is in pursuing this question, I claim, that we begin to 
see how the immediacy of ordinary self-knowledge is related to something deserving the name of 
first-person authority.  It is this question of the relation and priority of two modes of knowledge  
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of oneself that Bensusan is referring to when he speaks of “double access”, and he understands 
the possibility of such “double access” to be the source of the normative responsiveness of 
beliefs:    
   
      “In fact, double access to beliefs is what makes them 
responsive to norms. It makes beliefs corrigible on the light of other people’s 
beliefs. If we had no more than third-personal access to our own beliefs, we 
would be unable to attribute to them any capacity to guide action and thinking: 
my own beliefs would be oblivious to my mental life––or to anything that is in 
some sense internal to me, for that matter”    . 
   
There is certainly a sense in which the possibility of knowing what I think both through avowing 
it and through attributing some attitude to myself is responsible for the way beliefs are 
responsive to norms, but I think it’s a restricted sense.  That is, my beliefs can be responsive to 
norms in the sense of explicitly responding to criticism and counter-evidence presented to me in 
the course of argument with another person.  Explicit reasoning and justifying are possible for 
creatures who can avow their beliefs, because they can conclude to them, or decide on them, in 
the course of deliberation.  And responding to norms in the course of actual argument with 
another person is possible because each of the parties is understood to be in a position to speak 
for herself and not only about herself.  And a person would not be in a position to make a claim, 
giving her word on something, and hence invoke responsiveness to norms in that sense, if her 
only access to her beliefs were through attribution.  But I also think that this is not all there is to 
the idea of belief’s responsiveness to norms, since I would also want to say that, for instance, the 
flow and adjustment of ordinary perceptual beliefs is norm-guided and indeed responsive to 
norms.  That is, it isn’t only that norms apply to beliefs which are not subject to explicit 
deliberation (e.g., perceptual beliefs, animal beliefs), but that the norms we would apply to such 
beliefs are also part of what explain the normal good functioning of the beliefs in question.  If we 
are comfortable talking about animal beliefs at all (and I for one can’t see how this is 
dispensable), then surely their beliefs must be said to guide action (as well as other beliefs), even 
though such creatures have neither the capacity for avowal or the attribution of beliefs to 
themselves (lacking these concepts entirely).  In that case, the lack of “double access” does not 
mean that the cat stalking the bird is not guided by a belief about the bird’s location, or indeed 
responsive to new evidence of the bird’s suddenly taking flight.  It’s true that for a mature 
human, being a believer means, among other things, being able to say what you think, which is a 
matter of avowal, and being able to give your reasons, both of which require the recognition of a 
certain authority on the part of the speaker.  But at the same time, this concept of belief is a 
development from a wider notion of belief and other attitudes, along with their responsiveness to 
norms, that applies to creatures, both human and non-human, without any of these capacities.   
 
  This brings me to the final section of Bensusan’s paper, which concerns the question of 
the proper role of consideration of epistemic norms and virtues in the thinking of the deliberative 
agent in the course of making up her mind.  The thought he is following out here is that there is 
an epistemic parallel to Bernard Williams’ claim that some moral thinking in terms of specific 
moral virtues or traits involves importing a kind of external point of view on oneself and one’s  
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character, at the expense of the more properly first-person perspective directed outward on the 
situation and what it demands of one.  Hence, one’s epistemic reasoning as well as one’s moral 
deliberation may be distorted in parallel fashion, and thus fail to be “first-personal enough”.   
 
 
  “We claim that, if Williams is right about moral judgments, we can apply 
the idea that mental content is sometimes not as first-personal as it should be to 
beliefs in general. We can start out by considering epistemic (or doxastic) virtues, 
instead of moral virtues. Consider a case of someone that, in the process of 
acquiring and managing her beliefs, pays excessive attention at how reliable (or 
empirically adequate, or coherent, or widely accepted) her beliefs are when 
considered from a third-personal point of view. The suspicion is that she can be 
misdirecting her capacity to have a third-personal access to her beliefs.” 
 
I’m not sure just what the parallel would be here.  I can imagine an emphasis on justification that 
would be less a matter of concern with the truth and more of a matter of placing oneself 
epistemically beyond reproach, and perhaps this is related to what John McDowell means by a 
notion of justification that is more than mere exculpation.  Or I can imagine a kind of concern 
with justification that is part of the selective skepticism that can be employed in the exercise of 
bad faith and self-deception.  That is, in order to avoid drawing some obvious conclusion that is 
nonetheless disturbing to me, I tell myself that evidence is always ambiguous and that even the 
evidence of the senses has been known to be misleading, etc., and in this way I keep in suspense 
the conclusion I wish to avoid, all in the guise of an exaggerated epistemic scrupulousness.  And 
to move closer to the parallel with virtues of character, I can imagine such a person as being 
more concerned with the appearance (to himself) of epistemic responsibility than with arriving at 
the truth.  But cases like these may be said to express bad faith because they involve a sham 
concern with justification, a sham concern which seeks to defeat the point of justification itself.   
 
  If this is right, however, this would be something different from what Bensusan later 
describes in the following way:   
  “In our case just above, however, the person who pays excessive attention 
to the epistemic qualities of her beliefs can be neglecting the transparency that is 
open to her as a resource to establish her own beliefs. She will then be paying too 
much attention to the standards of evaluation for beliefs (that maybe she is ready 
to recommend and further to maintain) to an extent that would neglect her 
capacity to examine the world from the perspective of her beliefs; in this sense 
she can end up holding beliefs that are not first-personal enough––she could have 
a measure of what we can describe as a case of epistemic bad faith.” 
 
 
For here again I think we are employing different notions of ‘transparency’.  To begin with, I’m 
not sure what is meant by  “examin[ing] the world from the perspective of her beliefs”, since 
understood in one way there would seem to be no other possible perspective from which from 
which to examine the world, but if this is right then there is really no sense to the idea of holding  
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one’s beliefs side by side with the world and comparing the two.  Secondly, when he refers to 
this subject as  “neglecting the transparency that is open to her as a resource to establish her own 
beliefs”, I cannot recognize the notion of transparency from A&E since that notion concerns a 
way of answering a question about one’s own belief, and not an alternative to a concern with the 
justification of one’s beliefs.  The distortion he has in mind in the examples is described in terms 
of misguided attention to standards of evaluation for belief at the expense of attention to the 
world itself.  But when properly conducted, attention to and criticism of reasons, justification, 
and standards of evaluation just is the informed and sensitive attention to the world.  They are 
not opposed to each other, and in fact I would argue that the notion of ‘attention to the world’ 
itself has no sense apart from notions of criticism, justification, and standards of evaluation.   
   For these reasons, I think we do not want to draw the conclusion that “as far as the 
acquisition of beliefs is concerned, the talk of justification (or of epistemic or doxastic virtues) 
belong in a third-personal perspective”, since for the reasons I’ve outlined I don’t see that it 
would make sense to restrict the application of notions of justification to the third-person 
perspective.  And indeed, the idea that the justificatory norms for belief “belong in a third-person 
perspective” would seem to be in conflict with the previous thought that “double access to 
beliefs is what makes them responsive to norms”.  For there the thought was that it is the first-
person stance of avowal that makes possible the articulated notion of responsiveness to norms 
that goes with giving and asking for reasons.  I think this idea is closer to the truth, even though I 
did raise some questions about scope of this claim, assuming the extension of beliefs and their 
norms to, e.g., children and other creatures not (yet) initiated into the practices of justification.    
 
   
  I am very grateful to Carla Bagnoli for forcing me to re-think some of the basic 
formulations of A&E, but especially for carrying the discussion further from the first-person / 
third-person relations and asymmetries I discuss there, to the investigation of the second-person 
stance (something until recently absent from such discussions and which is therefore sometimes 
referred to as the “missing person”).  Any discussion of self-knowledge like mine, which takes 
an interest in the phenomena of alienation, has to consider the extent to which relations to 
oneself can approximate to relations to a genuine Other, and to what extent this is not possible.  
My own thinking here is somewhat complex and probably not explicit enough in the book, even 
though that question of the irreducibility of the different possible stances toward oneself and 
toward another was one of the primary motivations for writing the book.  So I very much 
welcome the opportunity to relate my thoughts in A&E to the concept of recognition, even as I 
will want to resist some of the implications of Bagnoli’s provocative claim that  “the authority of 
self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self 
and others, hence from a second-person stance.” 
 
  First, however, I need make a few interpretive points to make sure we are on the same 
page here, since on a couple of important points I could not be sure if Bagnoli was presenting 
some line of argument as representing my own view rather than a view I am discussing which I 
then distance myself from.  One such place is near the beginning of her paper where she is 
discussing the role of reflection and what she calls the “argument from suspension”.  After citing 
p. 144 of A&E, she says,  “When I reflect on my anger, I am free to choose whether to act on it  
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or not. Reflection shows that the occurring mental state does not dominate me.”  But of course 
nothing like this is guaranteed by logic alone, nor by the fact that one is a rational agent, for the 
only rational agents we are familiar with are the finite, flawed and compromised creatures that 
we are.  Hence the anger may continue to dominate me, its psychological force undiminished, 
even though I thoroughly disapprove of it and may be ashamed of it.  Reflection may succeed in 
bringing me to separate myself from my anger, so that I don’t act on it, even while I continue to 
feel it.  But I might also succeed in separating myself from it, and disapprove of it, and yet still 
act on it in the heat of the moment.  Reflection may succeed in bringing me to see that my anger 
is ugly, unworthy, even thoroughly unjustified, and yet this separation may fail in another, more 
intimate way.  For my rejection of my anger may be thoroughly genuine and sincere, and yet the 
anger itself continues to structure my orientation toward this person or this situation, directing 
my thoughts along the channels laid out by my anger.  That is, in these cases not only does 
reflection fail to prevent me from acting on my anger, but it also fails to undo the thinking and 
feeling, as well as the motivational pathways, that are constitutive of the anger itself.  Both one’s 
thought as well as one’s action can remain dominated by an attitude that one rejects, and one 
may be perfectly conscious of this.  My own claim instead is that reflection on one’s attitudes 
will normally be part of the deliberation that alters and adjusts them, otherwise we couldn’t see 
attitudes in general as rational.  In itself this is not a terribly new idea.  What I hope is more 
novel is my attempt to relate this thought to the asymmetries of Self and Other, and specifically 
to the fact that a certain central form of self-knowledge can proceed without evidence, and that 
this is explained by reference to the Transparency condition, which is itself to be understood as a 
consequence of the rational agent’s normal ability to constitute his mind through reflection.   
 
  Another point takes us closer to Bagnoli’s introduction of the second-person standpoint. 
At times in her exposition she understands my distinction between explanatory reasons and 
justifying reasons to line up with, or perhaps even be equivalent to, the distinction between third-
person and first-person perspectives.  Bringing the perspective of justifying reasons to bear in 
both third-person and second-person contexts is then in preparation for seeing the deliberative 
perspective as itself essentially second-personal, an internal dialogue with an Other.  When I first 
introduce the idea of ‘deliberative reflection’, in Chapter Two, I distinguish it from the (merely) 
normative appraisal of one’s state, for this sort of appraisal (e.g., as justified or unjustified) 
applies just as well to thinking about another persons attitudes as it does to my relation to my 
own.   
 
  The idea of 'deliberative' reflection about one's response is meant to 
denote something more than simply the normative appraisal of it, the sort of 
reflection that would terminate in some settled assessment of it.  For the mere 
appraisal of one's attitudes, however normative, would apply equally well to past 
as well as to current attitudes, and indeed may have just the same application to 
another person as to oneself.  In itself, such assessment is not an essentially first-
person affair.  Rather, 'deliberative' reflection as intended here is of the same 
family of thought as practical reflection, which does not conclude with a 
normative judgement about what would be best to do, but with the formation of 
an actual intention to do something. (A&E, p. 59)  
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At times, however, Bagnoli seems to take me to be see the standpoint of justificatory reasons (as 
opposed to explanatory reasons) as exclusively first-personal and having no application to the 
actions or attitudes of other people at all.   
 
  “Justifying reasons are reasons that I endorse as I deliberate about what to 
do, what to feel or what to believe. This kind of reasons is not available in the 
third-person perspective, when I consider the matter as a spectator. In the third-
personal perspective, Moran argues, reasons can only be explanatory: they 
amount to rationalizations of why the agent acted in a certain manner.” 
 
I’m not sure I’m reading her correctly here, but in this passage she seems to take herself to be 
paraphrasing my own view, since she corrects me a paragraph later, by referring to Nagel on 
impersonal reasons.   
 
  The third-person perspective is not always cast so as to renounce 
justification. On the contrary, it is often proposed as a theory of justifying reasons 
for action (Nagel 1970). [...]  I call attention onto this alternative construal of the 
third-person approach to show that the third-person perspective does not 
necessarily map onto the theoretical or contemplative perspective, nor does it 
coincide with the domain of explanatory reasons, as Moran’s discussion 
assumes.” 
 
I very much agree with the gist of this, since it is important to my understanding of the 
deliberative perspective, whose conclusion is a form of conviction and hence brings me to a new 
state of mind, to distinguish this from the perspective of evaluation or justificatory reasons which 
have application equally to my own attitudes as well as the attitudes of others, where my own 
estimation of their justificatory status may well remain a mere appraisal and make no difference 
to the attitudes themselves.  Hence the stance of justification and the stance of explanation both 
have ordinary application in our third-personal relations to others as well as to ourselves.
1   
                                                 
 
1 Another place where I am somewhat more explicit about this is p. 130: 
 
“From the agent's perspective, the question of the truth of his beliefs is prior to the question of 
how they will dispose him to act.  Beliefs 'aim at truth', and do not enter into his practical 
reasoning in a way that brackets the question of their truth.  The interpreter, on the other hand, 
will be interested in how beliefs explain behavior, and this is a role played by false beliefs quite 
as often as by true ones.  Any representational state will have such a dual aspect, one under 
which it is transparent to the world in a certain way, another under which it makes a contribution 
to the behavior of the agent.  Naturally these different interests in belief are not restricted to the 
first- and third-person uses, respectively.  In communicating and reasoning with others, for 
instance, we are concerned with the truth, and not just the explanatory adequacy, of the beliefs 
we take them to have; while, on the other hand, in understanding oneself, one will sometimes  
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  The deliberative stance involves making up one’s mind and not only evaluating it.  And 
here Bagnoli raises intriguing questions about a place for this stance in the context of 
deliberating not about but with another person; thus, the second-person standpoint.  There are 
several important strands to this thought, and I will only be able to touch on a few of them here.  
One such strand concerns the notion of recognition, particularly in the Fichtean / Hegelian guise 
of Anerkennung.  Bagnoli suggests transferring something of this structure of normativity to the 
understanding of the first-person situation of deliberation, at one point saying  “The normative 
capacity to attribute or withdraw recognition to a given mental state [anger] is where the mind 
resides.”  I think we need to tread carefully here, since the concept of ‘recognition’ is ambiguous 
in multiple ways, some of which allow for equivocation between the Hegelian motif of 
Anerkennung (to which the prospect of mutuality is internal), and the stances of endorsement 
and identification with an attitude associated with the writings of Harry Frankfurt.   
  As I understand it, the Fichtean / Hegelian notion of Anerkennung concerns the relation 
of one self-consciousness to another, as given a kind of definitive formulation in Hegel’s 
dialectic of recognition between Lord and Bondsman.  One seeks the recognition of another, a 
self-consciousness which is conceived of as free to give or withhold that recognition.  In fact, it 
is only as free that the response of the Other could have the value or meaning of recognition as 
such.  This is why it is a self-defeating strategy within this dialectic for one party to seek the total 
control or objectification of the Other as a way to secure the recognition it seeks, for with this 
annulment of the freedom of the Other is also lost the possibility of any response that could 
count as recognition.  ‘I’ as a self-consciousness seek recognition from another, and the lesson of 
the dialectic is that this cannot be pursued unilaterally, that even pure self-assertion in this arena 
must recognize itself as inextricably dependent on a freedom that is not its own.  
 
  This concept of recognition is implicated with various related concepts, such as 
validation and respect, as well as endorsement and identification as these ideas are at work, e.g., 
in the writings of Frankfurt and others.  Frankfurt, famously, identifies freedom of the will with 
the capacity to form ‘second-order volitions’, that is, the ability to have the will one wants to 
have.  A desire or other attitude may move me and yet be one that I thoroughly disapprove of, 
and perhaps seek, whether successfully or not, to rid myself of.  In this situation I am said to 
withhold endorsement from that desire.  I may see clearly that it is part of me, or operative in me, 
but I am alienated from it and do not identify with it.  So there is a certain resonance with the 
Fichtean / Hegelian notion of recognition.  In a Frankfurtian scenario, when I do not identify 
with a certain desire that is in another sense still ‘mine’, I may be said to invalidate it, even if its 
force remains undiminished by this ruling.  I withhold recognition from this desire not only in 
the simple sense of disapproving of it, but also in the sense of denying it a certain standing 
within my general deliberations.  My desire to return to the gaming tables, or the excitement that 
this desire makes vivid for me, does not count for me as a reason to go out gambling again, but is 
                                                 
need to bracket the question of the truth of one’s beliefs and concentrate on their explanatory 
role.” 
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instead treated as an intruder, a force to be reckoned with as potentially affecting my 
deliberations from without.   
  We may, then, speak of the refusal to identify with a particular desire or other attitude as 
a refusal of recognition, even a kind of denial of a kind of status to that desire within one’s 
general deliberative household.  But the differences between these two notions are as profound 
as their similarities, for there is nothing here corresponding to the desire for recognition from 
another self-consciousness, or the corresponding dependence on a freedom that is genuinely 
Other to oneself.  True, the language of ‘alienation’ in the Frankfurt scenario suggests a 
confrontation with something conceived of as essentially ‘other’ to oneself, but this ‘other’ will 
be something like the compulsion to gamble or an eruption of anger; that is, not another self-
consciousness, not something from which it would make sense for a person to seek recognition.   
Hence, I would say, the very idea of ‘mutuality’ has no application here.  There is, however, 
another dimension of the second-personal stance that Bagnoli has in mind as characterizing, or 
perhaps even grounding, normativity and justification, and it comes out in passages like the 
following:   
   
  “[T]he structure of justification is also second-personal. Reasons are 
considerations offered to another to justify a course of action or a mental state. 
My proposal is that we understand the second-personal structure according to a 
dialogical model. “I shall” is the conclusion of a dialogue that emerges from the 
recognition that I should account for my actions to others, and that I should 
demand justifications from them. I put myself under the rational scrutiny of others 
and demand the same. What I offer as a reason must count as a reason also for 
others, and what others offer as a reason must be something intelligible to me as a 
reason.” 
 
   There is much in this that I am in sympathy with, and that I think is very much worth 
further investigation (some of which Bagnoli herself is carrying out in other papers), but I still 
want to enter a couple of reservations.  It is one thing to claim that reasons must be public, the 
sort of thing that can be made intelligible to another person, shared or respected by another 
person, and this is an idea that has roots both in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, as well as 
in Wittgenstein.  It is quite another thing, however, to claim that reflection itself involves a 
second-person stance, a dialogue with a genuine other.  For a second-person stance means a 
stance toward a separate freedom, a “self-originating source of claims” (Rawls), something 
calling upon me and demanding my respect.  I do not stand in such a relation to my own attitudes 
or to myself.  My understanding of self-other asymmetries is grounded in the sense that they are 
the source not only of the ‘privileging’ of the first-person in first-person authority, but also the 
source of various forms of dis-privileging of the first-person, the blind-spots that are the obverse 
of first-person authority, but also the fact that there is a range of stances that are reserved for our 
relations to others and which can only with various degrees of incoherence be adopted toward 
oneself.  Gratitude, envy, forgiveness, promising, and believing a speaker are all, I would argue, 
possibilities reserved for our relations toward a fully independent other, a separate consciousness 
and a locus of freedom that is not one’s own.  Just how to characterize this separateness and 
independence, and the concomitant dependence on the freedom of another involved in, say,  
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contract or bargaining, are deep and difficult issues, as Bagnoli’s reference to Kant on the 
binding of oneself reminds us.   
  In insisting on a range of essentially ‘other-dependent’ attitudes, I don’t mean to 
exaggerate anymore than I do in the realm of first-person authority, but only to insist that the 
way forward on these problems has to respect asymmetries of both kinds.  Let the following 
example suffice for now.  Respecting another person’s wishes means giving them weight in my 
thinking and planning, even when I myself don’t see the point of those desires, even when I think 
them mistaken, even when I may feel that the other person would renounce them if she knew 
everything that I know about them.  In a situation of actual dialogue, I may be unable to bring 
her to see the pointlessness of what she desires in this situation.  And yet a concern for her 
autonomy may tell me that I must still respect her desires in this case nonetheless, even if I think 
she would regret the outcome.  If there is anything to the asymmetries between self and other that 
I have tried to delineate, then this sense of ‘respecting someone’s wishes’ does not make sense as 
an attitude toward oneself.  A desire that exerts a certain force on me, but which I cannot see the 
sense of is not one I am obliged to respect.  (Of course, I may find reason to respect it, if I feel 
that this obscure prompting may well lead me somewhere new, toward something valuable I 
could not have found otherwise.  See my reply to Josep Corbi.)   But a desire or other prompting 
which I take to be mistaken, or exaggerated, or unworthy, or something I will soon regret, is not 
something I have reason to retain and accommodate within the rest of my thinking and planning.  
Rather, it would seem that respecting oneself here means assuming responsibility for either the 
alteration or control of this attitude, or in any case that they “cannot enter into my thinking as the 
fixed beliefs and desires of some person or other, who happens to be me.” (A&E, p. 164) 
  
  When Bagnoli says that “the second-personal stance understands rational freedom not as 
a metaphysical property of the self, but as a practical relation structured by mutual recognition.”, 
there is a sense in which I can see this as continuous with a line of thought that I pursue in 
thinking about first-person authority as well as the authority to declare oneself in speech.  This is 
the sense in which the declaration of an intention, a belief, or a vow is something that requires 
the recognition of a certain authority.  Before a child is a certain age, we do not accept promises 
from her, and before a certain age, even something so simple as a declaration of intention will be 
acknowledged only in a qualified manner.  First-person authority can be seen as the authority to 
bring a certain organization to the complexity of one’s psychic life, to bring one’s orientation 
toward something (e.g., my immediate future action) to some kind of determinacy.   As in other 
cases this authority exists in being recognized, and in the discussions of akrasia we have seen 
how this authority can be impaired or lost, and the recognition of it withheld.  So I suspect my 
thought here is not so different from what Hegel meant when he famously said, “Self-
consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it exists for another; that is, it 
exists only in being acknowledged.”    
 
  In closing, I’ll try another way of expressing my reservations, and my sense that 
ineluctable self-other asymmetries are among the starting points for thinking about practical 
reason, and that this means it will be part of the understanding of what can be normatively 
binding in practical reason that there are limits to how much of this structure can be housed in a 
single self, limits to the extent to which one can make normative claims upon oneself like those  
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of a genuine Other.  Toward the end of her paper, Bagnoli quotes a famous and provocative 
formulation of Kant’s in the context of the problem of self-binding:  .   
 
  “When describing the working of “conscience”, which is one paradigmatic 
exercise of self-reflection, Kant notices that the “A man who accuses and judges 
himself in conscience must think of a dual personality in himself, a doubled 
(doppelte) self …”, Kant 1797: 438.  
 
   
The accusing and judging conscience is a familiar character in philosophy, literature, and life 
itself.  But in thinking about self-accusation and self-judgment I think we should make more of 
the fact that we don’t have anything like the same ease in talking about this agent who can 
accuse us (who is oneself) as also being in a position to do such things as falsely accuse, and 
therefore apologize, retract the accusation, and make reparations and ask for forgiveness from 
the injured party (ourselves), be punished or removed from office, or issue a blanket pardon 
(from oneself to oneself).  Judging, even condemning oneself has a much more secure place in 
our discourse than do parallel normative stances toward oneself like pardoning oneself, waiving 
rights of complaint against oneself, releasing oneself from a promise.  Various aspects of a 
relation to an existing Other to whom we are obliged in one way or another can only be 
described as obtaining in one’s relation to oneself with varying degrees of strained coherence 
(e.g., envy), preciousness (e.g., pardoning) or both.  Self-accusation doesn’t seem to come 
equipped with a corresponding role involving the other sides of justice as a relation between 
people, as if we had installed a judge who could only accuse and condemn and somehow lack the 
authority to exonerate or pardon.   
 
  But if the point of this comparison is to ground the bindingness of some normative 
demand upon us, then I think we have to take seriously the thought that we would have no reason 
to respect or feel bound by an actual judge whose authority was simply one-sided and implacable 
in this way.  (Even God is traditionally taken to be more of a genuine Other than this, and 
therefore able to favor, reward, and redeem as well as to judge, torture, and damn.)  What the 
one-dimensionality of conscience as the internalized Other suggests to me is that in trying to 
frame normative bindingness within the confines of a dialogue with oneself we are borrowing 
from those fragments of the structure of the normative, as it exists in our relations to existing 
Others, only those parts of it that will fit comfortably within the narrower range of relations to 
oneself that can be described without strain on what we might call the moral grammar of this 
family of concepts.   And in doing so we are of necessity working with a truncated concept of the 
normative (such as the voice that can only accuse) in which we cannot recognize our actual 
commitments and obligations.  Put briefly, for the work we want this concept to do, there is no 
substitute for an actual Other.  In making these remarks I realize that I have only responded to 
part of the picture that Bagnoli is presenting, both here and in other writings, so I present these 
reservations, as they say, “in the spirit of dialogue”.   
   